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IN CONSTRUCTING A DEMOCRATIC FOOD SYSTEM*
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and
LELAND GLENNA 
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
ABSTRACT
The future of farm policy in the United States will be influenced by trends in economic and political
globalization, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), due to the obligation of member nation-states
to make domestic policies conform to international trade agreements. Commentators have noted that the WTO
has been structured to favor transnational agribusiness at the expense of small farmers, food consumers, and
the natural environment. However, the WTO contains contradictions that might be exploited by alternative
agriculture advocates to influence Congressional interpretations of the trade agreement. This essay uses
reflexive modernization theory to highlight efforts by alternative agriculture groups in the U.S. to lay bare the
contradictions and advocate for agribusiness accountability, environmental protection and food sovereignty.
We seek to answer whether WTO negotiations and potential farm subsidy restrictions might provide an
opportunity for reforming the U.S. farm bill.
The end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st has exposed two
opposing forces in the world’s food system. According to Gil Gillespie, the current
president of the Agriculture, Food and Human Values Society (AFHVS), “One
tendency is toward high technology, global sourcing, and disconnecting from
nature, with profit being a key motivation. The other tendency is toward
emphasizing natural processes and local sourcing, with building ‘community’ and
serving human needs being key motivations” (Gillespie 2009; see also Morgan,
Marsden, and Murdoch 2008). An article in Science on the subject of the
International Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology for Development
called the conflicting perspectives “dueling visions for a hungry world” (Stokstad
2008:1474).
The Missouri School has long recognized the dueling visions for producing
food. More significantly, it has documented the social actors behind the competing
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visions. It has exposed the role of powerful transnational agribusinesses in propping
up the high technology, globally sourced, and ecologically destructive vision.  It has
also focused attention on the efforts of small farmers, religious organizations, food
activists, and other advocacy groups to construct a vision and strategy for devising
an alternative agrifood system. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has served as a focal point for debates
over these dueling visions since it was established in 1994. Much of the scholarship
on the WTO and agriculture has emphasized how it privileges the interests of
agribusiness over the interests of alternative agriculture groups. We do not
disagree with this perspective. However, in this paper, we consider the proposition
that the WTO contains structural contradictions that might be exploited by
alternative agriculture groups to promote a more socially and ecologically
sustainable vision for the agrifood system.
The theory of reflexive modernization focuses attention on the need for social
movements to be politically aware and effectively mobilized to exploit such
structural contradictions. We consider whether alternative agriculture groups in
the U.S. are becoming reflexively modern in their approach to domestic farm policy
formation. In respect to the agrifood system, contradictions become evident when,
for example, governments calling for free markets maintain large farm supports for
domestic producers. Such contradictions are aggravated when these policies harm
environmental integrity and compromise rural community viability.
After briefly describing the WTO and potential exploitable contradictions
within it, we discuss the theory of reflexive modernization. We then analyze the
Agribusiness Accountability Initiative’s  (AAI) efforts to influence U.S. agrifood1
system policies through the periodic farm bill. Focusing on the AAI in this study
is appropriate because it emerged in response to both the U.S. farm bill and world
trade talks, and it represents a host of civil society groups seeking to hold
agribusiness corporations accountable for the socially and ecologically destructive
agrifood system in which the world is embedded. We examine insights from the
AAI’s open network in North America and other regions of the world to determine
if reflexive modernization is evident in their discussions on promoting a sustainable
and equitable agrifood system. 
AAI network partners altered the name in January 2009 to “Agribusiness Action Initiatives” in1
response to the awkward use of the term “accountability” in regions outside North America; “Action
Initiatives” also more accurately conveys the host of working group activities among AAI partners.
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THE WTO AND CORPORATE POWER
The WTO is part of an era, beginning near the end of the Second World War
with the Bretton Woods Agreement, which initiated efforts to standardize
international monetary and marketing policies to facilitate international trade.
Transnational corporations prefer to avoid variations in standards, tariffs, and labor
and environmental regulations from one nation to the next because these create
uncertainty and high transaction costs. Business and government leaders who
support the WTO often refer to their efforts to smooth out discrepancies in
international markets as “leveling the playing field” (McMichael 2000a:126). 
Scholars counter that far from leveling the playing field, the WTO is a
mechanism utilized by transnational agribusinesses and supportive policy makers
to foster an agrifood system characterized by high technology, global sourcing,
ecological destruction, and profit maximization (McMichael 2000a, 2000b, 2008;
Watts and Goodman 1997). Specific policy changes, such as national deregulation
and international trade liberalization, have served to enhance the political and
economic power of transnational agribusinesses to promote their agenda through
such international trade agreements. 
An example of national deregulation is evident in the U.S. government’s
decision to relax enforcement of antimonopoly legislation in the early 1980s. Such
policy changes greatly facilitated the consolidation and concentration of
agribusinesses (Heffernan and Constance 1994). Heffernan (2000) and others
(Glenna 2003; McMichael 2008) have argued that large agribusinesses have gained
monopolistic and oligopolistic economic control of markets at various links in the
value chains, enabling them to extract profits at the expense of raw material
producers. McMichael (2000a:126) states that the resulting political and economic
power led to “agribusiness imperialism,” whereby nations adopt “free trade rhetoric
[which] thereby justifies the use of institutional means to extend markets for
agribusiness at the expense of small farmers across the world.” This enhanced
power is often exercised through efforts to promote deregulation and trade
liberalization on the global scale through the WTO.
These assessments of the rationale behind the WTO and the privileging of large
agribusiness at the expense of small farmers and consumers are insightful and
important. However, there is a tendency to overlook some contradictions within the
WTO and the opportunities such contradictions provide for efforts to create an
alternative system. Narlikar (2006) has described how WTO trade negotiators have
used the concept of “fairness,” but notes that the way the concept is defined depends
upon those doing the negotiations and the forums in which they are negotiating. A
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similar observation can be made regarding how international trade agreements are
converted into domestic policy. Because of the U.S. negotiating trade agreements
that may limit domestic options, the U.S. Congress has a great deal of flexibility in
interpreting and implementing trade agreements. As a result, a concept like
“fairness” remains vague or glibly used until constituent groups rally to shape the
way Congressional representatives interpret and implement fairness into policies.
Kingdon (1995: 165) uses the term “policy window” to refer to a brief “opportunity
for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their
special problems.” An equally contentious concept is “food sovereignty”, emanating
from a sense of fairness among its proponents, and expanding to include the
complexities of social responsibility, corporate accountability and democratic
participation in respect to a country’s agrifood system. 
A key contradiction in the WTO, specifically in its Agreement on Agriculture
(AoA), is the claim to reduce trade-distorting subsidies while conceding to keep
some subsidies in place, as long as the rationale for those subsidies is revised
(Murphy 2005). The WTO’s AoA categorizes subsidies into three “boxes.” The
most acceptable “Green Box” includes fixed payments to producers for
environmental programs, if the payments are “decoupled” from current production
levels. The “Amber Box” includes domestic subsidies that governments have agreed
to reduce over time. The “Blue Box” contains subsidies that can be increased
without limit, if payments are linked to production-limiting programs (Thompson
2005). 
U.S. Farm Policy and Agribusiness Influence
Despite the shift in emphasis from domestic to international economic issues,
international trade agreements such as the WTO must still pass through a nation’s
legislative body. When international trade agreements are negotiated by the U.S.
Administration and ratified by the Senate, the U.S. Congress is then obligated to
make domestic farm policy conform. Yet, Congress has flexibility in interpreting
and implementing trade agreement specifications into domestic policy, though the
WTO may limit options. How domestic farm policy is reframed to conform to the
WTO’s AoA is a point of contestation that may enable alternative agriculture
groups a point of entry. Policymakers in Europe and the U.S. have argued that farm
subsidies are needed to protect small farmers, but more than half of EU support
goes to 1% of producers and 70% of subsidies in the U.S. go to 10% of producers
(World Development Report 2008). A USDA study has indicated that fewer large
farmers now account for a larger share of agricultural commodity production, and
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hence, receive a larger portion of subsidy payments (MacDonald, Hoppe, and
Banker 2005). 
U.S. farm policy has long privileged large farmers and agribusinesses. In their
examination of the New Deal era of the 1930s, Gilbert and Howe (1991) describe
how three classes of farmers—sharecroppers and farm laborers; family farmers and
small landowners; and capitalist farmers and plantation owners—competed to shape
farm policies to suit their own unique interests. Each class of farmers scored some
policy victories in the forms of production controls, long-term agricultural
planning, and rural social reform. However, these constituent groups were not able
to maintain these policy victories for long. After the Second World War, U.S.
agricultural legislation focused primarily on management of production. This shift
in focus guaranteed that commodity and soil conservation programs would
eventually favor larger and higher output capitalist farmers over laborers,
sharecroppers, and small farmers (Gilbert and Howe 1991). The combination of
price supports and supply management functioned as the essential outline of federal
farm policy through the rest of the twentieth century (Effland 2000). 
Though postwar farm policy favored large farmers, policy changes since the
mid-1980s have favored the agribusinesses that process the agricultural
commodities produced by those large farmers. Glenna’s (2003) analysis of the “farm
crisis” of the mid-1980s offers insights into the policy dynamics that enabled this
structural shift in favor of larger farmers. He points out that, although there was
much talk about a “farm crisis” in the mid-1980s and the need to help farmers, the
actual definition of farmers began to change. Agricultural commodity processing
companies began to describe farmers as “raw material suppliers,” and emphasized
the need to maintain cheap and abundant raw materials to maintain international
market share. The distribution of subsidy payments, therefore, may be better
described as subsidizing agribusinesses’ raw material supply than subsidizing small
farmers.
The point we want to emphasize is that U.S. agricultural policy is sustaining the
globally sourced, ecologically destructive, corporate dominated vision for the
agrifood system. Therefore, the WTO’s challenge to that system may create an
opportunity. Alternative agriculture groups could exploit the WTO’s color boxes
in the AoA to make the case for redistributing subsidy payments to smaller, more
environmentally friendly farmers that produce for local consumption. Some farm
advocacy groups may continue to support the existing subsidy system, because
small farmers still receive some, albeit meager, benefits. The question, then, is
whether the AAI, which includes farm advocacy groups, has developed a critical
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stance toward the existing agrifood system and recognizes the potential to use the
WTO to undermine it. 
Reflexive Modernization and Alternative Agriculture
Social movement theorists have debated whether social movements emerge and
succeed because of the state's structural weakness (opportunity structure) or
because of clearly defined collective interests and effective mobilization strategies
(resource mobilization).  Kurzman (1996) and McAdam (1982) contend that we need
a combination of the two if we are to understand social movements.  Reflexive
modernization is a useful concept because it provides a proscription for emerging
social movements that takes seriously the importance of opportunity structures and
resource mobilization.  Beck, Giddens, and Lash (1995) argue that structural
Marxists' flaw is to claim that a new modernity will emerge from the existing social
order without collective political awareness and mobilization.  By incorporating
political awareness into the theory, reflexive modernization provides a way of
exploring the reflexivity of a budding social movement: Are groups aware of both
the opportunity structure and their need for collective preparedness to exploit that
opportunity structure? 
Reflexive modernization studies have been conducted on environmental,
identity, and resistance to technology movements (e.g., Beck 1995; Beck et al. 1995;
Giddens 1994). What has received less attention is the role of reflexive
modernization in the alternative agriculture movement in the U.S. (Bonanno 1998). 
DATA: AAI CASE STUDY
One of us works for an alternative agricultural policy organization that
sponsors and participates in the Agribusiness Accountability Initiative. This
allowed ready access to strategy documents and planning sessions that a host of
alternative agricultural policy advocates prepared for farm bill hearings and WTO
ministerial meetings. We analyze their reports and actions to determine whether
the advocates are using the potential agreements of the WTO to frame their
approach to the agricultural policy debate. Small farm and alternative agriculture
advocates, farmland conservationists and environmentalists, labor unions, food
consumer groups, and other citizens interested in diverting power away from
agribusinesses and industrial farm interests may also find that the WTO could offer
them opportunities. Creative people and groups who are aware of the U.S. Farm Bill
policy process could probably use the WTO as leverage.
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Through participant observation in strategy sessions and collection of policy
documents, we have assembled a narrative of the policy debates and strategies for
influencing policy makers. We have analyzed this data with an eye toward the
recognition that agricultural subsidies favor larger farms and agribusinesses. More
important, we have highlighted references to the WTO as a mechanism that can be
used to argue for restructuring those agricultural subsidies in farm bill policy
debates. 
AAI, Reflexive Modernization, and the WTO
The AAI began in 2001 as an open and continuous forum for sharing research,
advocacy ideas, and public education strategies to address the impact of
transnational agrifood corporations on the livelihoods and food security of farmers,
workers, and communities around the world. Sponsored by the Center of Concern
(based in Washington, D.C.) and the National Catholic Rural Life Conference (based
in Des Moines, Iowa), the Initiative is managed by a Secretariat comprising the
sponsors and a full-time global coordinator. A global advisory committee and
regional facilitators based in and representing North America, Europe, South
America, Asia and Africa serve as steerers in the strategy formation and research
efforts of the Agribusiness Accountability Initiative. Except the AAI global
coordinator, the others are self-employed or affiliated with organizations in their
region or home country.
During the first few years of AAI, regional and global forums in North America
and Europe were held to bring together activists, academic researchers and food
system experts to identify new approaches for agrifood corporate accountability.
The AAI has since developed a web-based resource and clearinghouse  to provide2
information on agribusiness oligopoly power, not only in the U.S. and North
America, but extensive research coming out of Europe and, as contacts spread,
research from South America, Asia, and Africa. Proceeding from AAI’s initial efforts
to identify the stakeholder groups most affected by corporate concentration and
engage them in discussion about common approaches to the problem, AAI is now
engaged in facilitating the formation of cross-constituency working groups to
collaborate on specific action initiatives.
Users of the AAI Clearinghouse website include researchers, activists, and social justice advocates2
who seek more information about the impact of corporate oligopoly power on the food system and
forms of response and resistance. See www.agribusinessaccountability.org for access to the
Clearinghouse.
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Noting that AAI followed upon U.S. civil society efforts during the 2002 Farm
Bill, which sought reforms in the entrenched policies of agricultural commodity
production is important. The leading organizations included the National Family
Farm Coalition and the National Campaign for Sustainable Agriculture (now part
of the National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition), which were also founding
members of AAI. With environmental, labor, food and consumer groups, these
cross-constituency partners sought a reduction in commodity payments and a
greater emphasis on conservation, rural development, renewable energy and more
nutritious food assistance programs. AAI’s core initiators believe this constellation
of civil society actors could also be organized to confront powerful agribusiness
corporations. AAI found its theoretical and foundational basis in a National
Farmers union-commissioned report, “Consolidation in the Food and Agriculture
System,” prepared by Heffernan, Hendrickson & Gronski (1999). Given that
agrifood corporations held market power throughout the food system effectively
creating “food chain clusters” on a transnational stage, civil society groups would 
also need to coordinate along the agrifood chain and collaborate in resistance to
powerful corporations across borders. 
Also at this time, the third WTO ministerial taking place in November 1999 in
Seattle provided the opportunity to build farm, labor, and environmental group
contacts. This led to direct involvement by subsequent AAI network partners to
parallel meetings of civil society groups at WTO ministerial meetings in Cancun
in 2003 and Hong Kong in 2005. Thus, the mass protest in Seattle had a
constructive element to the extent that it elevated the perspective of the
international interconnectedness of alternative farm groups. 
Two significant supporters of the AAI include Action Aid International and the
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, both with substantial global networks
and being active in monitoring and evaluating U.S. and world trade agricultural
policies. In their analysis, the promotion of trade liberalization, particularly as
structured in the current WTO’s AoA, ignored basic elements of the global
agriculture economy, specifically the concentration of market power by
transnational corporations (Eagleton 2004; Murphy 2002). Both Murphy and
Eagleton drew from the “Heffernan Study” (see Heffernan et al. 1999) and the
analysis of the Missouri School regarding the global agrifood system. They argued
that the AoA, despite its emphasis on reducing subsidies and allowing greater
market access, will not successfully move member states toward the underlying
development goals articulated during the Doha Round of the WTO until it
addresses market power and the question of monopoly power. 
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The AoA rules of the WTO are designed to address national policies that
distort global markets for agriculture, namely to curb subsidy use by the U.S., E.U.,
and Japan and to remove trade barriers among the myriad of developing nations.
What the rules did not adequately address, according to AAI partners, is market
power by the handful of large agribusinesses, the true beneficiaries of cheap crop
commodities. “To put it in simple terms, many believe there are only two things
wrong with the AoA: the lack of political will to implement the agreement and the
disproportionate capacity of rich countries to create exceptions to the rules for
themselves. Both observations reflect abuses of power by developed countries and
must be addressed” (Murphy 2002: 2). 
This perspective reflects an emerging reflexive modernization. It indicates that
AAI recognizes flaws in the subsidy system and that the WTO may provide an
opportunity for them to challenge the subsidies. Simultaneously, AAI recognizes
that the collective definition of the opportunity structure has not yet been defined
in a way that would enable the AAI to exploit it. The AAI’s critical political-
economic view of the global agrifood system reveals a perspective that much of the
academic econometric modeling, as well as the rhetoric surrounding different
negotiating positions taken by national delegations, missed essential aspects of the
agricultural sector in most countries. Murphy (2002) further stressed that it is not
just a problem of continued subsidies and supports within industrialized nations,
but the structural result of an agricultural sector dominated by transnational
agribusiness firms. “The level playing field promoted by trade liberalizers will have
to include some kind of handicap to ensure that transnational agribusiness pay the
real costs for the grain they process, ship and sell” (Murphy 2002:12).
AAI’s Opponent: The Counter Discourse of the Elite Punditry
Among trade negotiators in the U.S. and EU, it is a rhetorical refrain that
farmers in developing countries have much to gain from agricultural trade
liberalization. These claims have been dutifully proclaimed by the news media over
the past decade. During the WTO ministerial meetings from 1996-2005, major
media in the United States often portrayed trade liberalization, and the WTO
negotiations in particular, as necessary for global economic progress. They assume
that trade liberalization is good for consumers because the theory of comparative
advantage predicts lower prices without necessarily compromising quality. They
also assume that it is good for developing countries, because wealthier countries
have more tax revenues to invest in trade-distorting subsidies, which gives them an
unfair advantage. Developing nations are also seeking access to U.S. and EU
9
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markets for their products. Some call this the “trade, not aid” solution to a
developing nation’s economic growth. 
Leading up to and following the WTO negotiations in Hong Kong in December
2005, major newspapers in the U.S. expressed disapproval that the United States,
Japan, and the European Union refuse to eliminate protections on agricultural
goods and textiles (see LAT 2005; NYT 2005; WP 2005). As a New York Times
editorial (NYT 2005:A12) stated, “The very same club of rich countries who go
around the world hectoring the poor to open up their markets to free trade put up
roadblocks when those countries ask the rich to dismantle their own barriers to free
trade in agriculture.”
There is some accuracy in the accusations of hypocrisy and potential benefits for
developing countries. When trade negotiations began after the Second World War,
the industrialized member nations excluded agricultural policies from consideration
because many nations assumed that national security was interconnected with a
nation’s capacity to produce its own food. When agricultural policies were finally
included in the GATT and WTO negotiations, the industrialized countries often
did so in a way that would enable them to sell their surplus commodities in
developing countries, which subsequently undermined commodity prices for small
farmers in those countries (McMichael 2000a). 
However, AAI recognizes that mainstream newspapers are misleading
themselves and their readers when they assert that developing countries would
benefit significantly if only wealthy country politicians were willing to stop
subsidizing their powerful agricultural constituents. Among some who assess such
claims and inform the AAI discourse, there is clear evidence that the promise of
agricultural trade liberalization is overstated, while the costs to small-scale farmers
in developing countries are often high (Wise 2008). Wise used World Bank data
and analyses, United Nations trade data, and other economic modeling carried out
to inform the current round of WTO negotiations to show that rich countries are
the main beneficiaries of agricultural trade liberalization, since they use the policies
to gain markets in both the global North and South. Only a few developing
countries (e.g., Argentina and Brazil) can compete effectively in these global
markets. For small-scale farmers in most developing countries, they suffer the
negative effects of rising imports as tariffs and farm supports are removed.
Furthermore, the international benefits of eliminating crop subsidies in the U.S.
may have been overstated. Studies have shown that subsidy reductions for cotton
and rice may raise global prices, for example, but reductions would minimally affect
corn (Ray, De La Torre Ugarte, and Tiller 2003). Any potential benefits that
10
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developing countries might see from access to industrial markets would depend
upon how the markets are structured, and transnational agribusinesses often have
disproportionate influence on structuring markets (McMichael 2008). 
Contradictions in the Discourse of the Elite Punditry
TIME Magazine ran a lengthy article opining that the 2008 farm bill would be
better for small farmers and the environment if it were forced to accommodate the
WTO's restrictions (Grunwald 2007). AAI working group members made a similar
argument during the 2008 Farm Bill process to shift subsidies out of commodity
production and to provide greater support for conservation and rural development
programs. Or in the parlance of the WTO negotiations, to shift to the Green and
Blue boxes of acceptable national supports. Such redirection in support payments
would be a direct challenge to the current U.S. farm system, since it would reduce
the predominant emphasis on the production of cheap raw materials for
agribusiness.
These experiences in convening international trade and agriculture system
experts at regional forums convinced AAI network members that successful efforts
to reform national policies would require solid, credible academic research on the
structure of the food industry, the relevant market share data for the largest
companies, and reliable socioeconomic analysis of the impacts of this structure. An
AAI steering committee member from the Canadian National Farmers Union
created a web-based matrix to house and show the data on which companies
controlled segments of the food system in different parts of the world (see
www.marketsharematrix.org). Further analysis on how this led to concentrated
sectors in the agrifood industry structure is proving crucial to the unveiling of
market and price distortions, labor rights violations, environmental degradation,
and other outcomes injurious to producers and consumers alike. 
An important theme for AAI global partners was to emphasize the "corporate
power plank" in the food sovereignty platform. Most civil society efforts on justice
in developing countries began to use the “food sovereignty” paradigm as the basis
for their advocacy demands. Food sovereignty refers to the right to produce food
on one's own territory, namely the claimed right of people to define their own food,
agriculture, livestock and fisheries systems in contrast to having food largely
subject to international market forces (see http://viacampesina.org/main_en/). AAI
has interacted with Via Campesina affiliates for several years. They share the
perspective that corporate control is the most important impediment to adoption
of the food sovereignty agenda and should be identified as such in advocacy efforts. 
11
Gronski and Glenna: World Trade, Farm Policy, and Agribusiness Accountability: The Ro
Published by eGrove, 2009
TRADE, FARM POLICY & AGRIBUSINESS ACCOUNTABILITY 141
With North American strategy, U.S. partner groups began to see that increased
public and media attention to the problems of corporate power in the food system
was needed. This in turn would create pressure on the U.S. Congress to seriously
consider reforms in the traditional patterns of the Farm Bill. AAI working groups
developed plans to raise the concern of industry influence on health and safety
regulations, agricultural trade, food aid, and subsidy policies. Oxfam America
substantially contributed to this new outlook on the global food system, not only
through their own analysis and “Fairness in the Fields” campaigns (Oxfam 2006),
but provided financial support to AAI for such advocacy efforts.
A key success for AAI in the U.S. was to document the political influence of
agrifood companies and their capacity to shape agricultural investment and trade
policy. AAI launched a working group on “revolving door” appointments of
industry executives to regulatory and policy roles at the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. The outcome, generating media attention, was the release of “USDA,
Inc.: How Agribusiness has Hijacked Regulatory Policy at the U.S. Department of
Agriculture” (Mattera 2004). The report lays out case studies of five decisions made
at the highest levels of the Agriculture Department that appear to favor the
immediate interests of the food industry over the legitimate concerns of producers,
consumers and the environment. The outcome of this report was expansion into a
broader reform movement (www.revolvingdoor.info) to limit corporate influence
across the U.S. federal government.
Tipping Points to Policy Reform
As suggested at the beginning of this essay, alternative agriculture interest
groups need to be aware of ways they can influence Congressional policymakers
who interpret and comply with WTO agricultural agreements. The ongoing debate
around implementation and ongoing appropriations of the 2008 Farm Bill in a
period of federal deficits is also changing the context of how Congress will approach
agricultural policy. To be heard on Capitol Hill, local and state-based organizations
may want to consider cross-constituency collaborative strategies for influencing
policy debates and decisions. Significant influence is certain to be exerted by
commodity organizations and conventional farm organizations that represent
commercial farm operations receiving most of the agricultural subsidies. Smaller,
more local and diverse farm advocacy groups have remarkably less lobbying power.
To move from current reality to a future that embodies a vision of a socially just
and sustainable farm and food system, the challenge is to identify the discrete policy
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levers that not only address key problems directly, but can have more extensive,
transformative effects. 
These policy options must be realistically assessed as to practicality and public
viability. These options must also be focused on critical “tipping points” within the
system, so that the relative weak position of local farm and food groups can still
move agricultural policy in a new direction. A way to accomplish that shifting of
public debate may be to articulate the arguments in a way that accommodate WTO
outcomes. AAI partners who are also members of the National Sustainable
Agriculture Coalition (http://sustainableagriculture.net/) continue federal policy
advocacy efforts through Coalition staff based in Washington, D.C. The Bush
Administration opened the door to limiting farm commodity payments, but the
previous Congress would not budge. According to reports from the Sustainable
Agriculture Coalition, the new Administration is likely to consider payment limits
at some point (SAC 2008). The Coalition also monitors activities on Capitol Hill
and provides alerts when legislation related to the Farm Bill occurs, such as reforms
to limit commodity payments.
In the U.S. South, these policy reform opportunities are finding civic levels of
support; a notable example of an advocacy group is the Southern Sustainable
Agriculture Working Group and its array of local and national partners
(www.ssawg.org/organizations.html). Their mission is to empower and inspire
farmers, individuals, and communities in the South to create an agricultural system
that is ecologically sound, economically viable, socially just, and humane. With
other regional sustainable agriculture regional groups (Midwest, Northeast,
California and West), these once localized groups are expanding their networks to
create tipping points in farm and food policies at the federal level. This was
attempted during the 2008 Farm Bill efforts through the Farm and Food Policy
Project (see http://www.farmandfoodproject.org/), but limited in affecting
commodity reform by its own assessment.
DISCUSSION
We recognize that the emergence of opportunity structures may have ironic
outcomes. The 1996 Farm Bill was nicknamed the “Freedom to Farm Act” because
policy makers claimed it was designed to get government out of agriculture
(Schertz and Doering 1999). Far from leading to a reduction of subsidies, U.S.
government expenditures in agricultural subsidies to large farm commodity
producers have risen dramatically since the passage of the 1996 Farm Bill. During
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the decade of 1995-2005, the U.S. government spent $164.7 billion in agricultural
subsidies (EWG 2006). 
The 2002 Farm Bill (“Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002”) again
addressed a comprehensive set of issues related to agriculture, ecology, energy,
trade and nutrition. This farm bill directed approximately $16.5 billion per year
toward farm commodity payments. Various attempts by Congress were made to
shift money away from these commodity subsidies to conservation measures
(notably the Conservation Security Program), but in the end the House of
Representatives held to business as usual—despite a new period of budget deficits.
In contrast to high commodity prices just a few years earlier, stagnant prices for
farm products continued through the turn of the decade and Congress was afraid
to tinker with reforms in the 2002 farm bill. The odd combination of free market
principles and flawed farm policy was bringing together diverse advocates for
change. Equally troubling to many were the high profit margins for large
agribusiness corporations, casting significant doubt about the legitimacy of
subsidizing farm production.
The 2008 Farm Bill (“Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008”) is a
continuation of the 2002 Farm Bill and consequently a disappointment to many
seeking policy reforms. The bill maintained the long history of agricultural
subsidies, even as it as opened new ground in respect to renewable energy,
conservation, nutrition, and rural development programs. So while some advocates
saw a glimmer of reforms to come, many felt their criticisms of U.S. farm policy and
subsidies fell on closed Congressional ears. Their arguments for reform did not
resonate, despite evidence that (1) subsidies create perversion of world commodities
markets and (2) subsidies end up in the pockets of wealthy conglomerates, not
struggling family farmers (EWG 2006).
This discussion on U.S. farm bills is relevant for this paper because it highlights
how talk about the WTO favoring large farms and agribusiness is redundant. The
point here is that in an agrifood system dominated by large agribusiness, outcomes
may not be consistent with the rhetoric of the opportunity structures. However, one
reason that the opportunity may not have been exploited in the past is that the
alternative agriculture advocacy groups have not recognized the opportunity and
they have not been organized adequately to exploit it. 
Alternative agriculture groups that comprise the AAI now seem to recognize
the opportunity and the need for collective political awareness and effective
mobilization. From the perspective of small farmers, alternative agriculture
supporters, and environmental protection advocates, there is little in the U.S. farm
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policy that is worthy of preservation. There is at least a nascent recognition that the
imminent restructuring of U.S. farm policy to conform to WTO restrictions might
provide a new opportunity for reforming U.S. farm policy.
The connection between fairer agricultural subsidies and broader environmental
and socioeconomic benefits is important because it indicates a point of contention
for the alternative agriculture movement in the U.S. Ironically, if alternative
agriculture organizations were to press policymakers to make domestic farm
policies conform to the “free trade” rhetoric, they might actually make domestic
farm policy fairer. This is where the WTO agricultural policies become important.
The vigorous, even violent, protests against globalization and neoliberalism at the
WTO ministerial meetings since the third meeting in Seattle (November 1999)
indicate that many labor, farmer, environmental, consumer and social justice
organizations agree. However, the focus on civil society resistance to the WTO can
overlook the creative and strategic aspects of the activists’ involvement in serious
discussions with government officials and parallel meetings during WTO
ministerial gatherings. The basis of their discussions was not to stop trade per se,
but to mitigate the shortcomings of free trade upon labor conditions and
environmental effects while advocating for a transparent, accountable, and “fair
trade” global system (McMichael 2000b).
CONCLUSION
The WTO's challenge to the existing agricultural subsidy program represents
a potential opportunity structure for the alternative agriculture movement.  The
question we have explored is whether the alternative agriculture movement is
reflexively modern to the extent that they recognize the structured opportunity and
whether they are collectively mobilizing to exploit it. Our analysis suggests that
AAI partners do recognize an opportunity structure. Simultaneously, they
recognize the immense power of their opponents. The ability to overcome that
power through collective mobilization to exploit the opportunity remains an open
question.
Reflexive modernization indicates the need for citizen groups to realize that
citizen groups can exploit contradictions in international trade policies, such as the
glaring ones in the WTO when liberalizing markets for transnational corporations
while lessening the ability of governments and citizens to manage their agrifood
systems. Whereas transnational agribusiness expected to utilize the WTO to its
own advantage, contradictions within the WTO are currently being used by
citizens to raise public concerns and promote small-scale agriculture that is more
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favorable for local development and environmental protection. Given the power of
a few private corporations in the agrifood system, a more comprehensive public
review process is required that increases public consultation on major issues.
Alternative agriculture groups seek permanent places on decision making bodies
within the state and working partnerships between governments, business, and
community organizations. The key for AAI and similar activities by other
alternative agriculture groups in the U.S. is to focus on the WTO as an opportunity
rather than dismiss it as a neoliberal fait accompli.
If the WTO eventually requires a reduction in the current level of spending
under the U.S. Farm Bill, then policy makers will need to respond by shifting
funding from trade-distorting production subsidies into “Green Box” programs that
are permissible under WTO rules. Such programs are shaping up to be direct
supports to family farms, rural enterprise development, environmental conservation
and nutritionally healthy communities. The “tipping point” argument for a
reformed farm and food policy does not grow out of a particular economic
philosophy, or an argument for or against trade, and certainly not political
affiliation. It begins with the recognition that agricultural trade mainly benefits
those agribusiness corporations able to capture inordinate market share throughout
the agrifood chain of inputs, processing and distribution. It culminates with the
realization that policies need to be reformed if broad public benefits are to be
distributed to rural America. Those who promote sustainable agriculture and viable
rural communities can use the current policy context to create a setting for
agriculture as if people and place mattered. 
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